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GOVERNING STANDARD 
The Russell Plaintiffs set forth the governing standard in their opening brief. 
Because the district court's dismissal was made pursuant to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the 
standard is of the utmost importance and is repeated here. 
The Utah Supreme Court has ruled that in deciding motions to dismiss, trial courts 
"must 'accept the factual allegations in the complaint as true and consider all reasonable 
inferences to be drawn from those facts in a light most favorable to the plaintiff.'" Prows 
v. State, 822 P.2d 764, 766 (Utah 1991) (citing St. Benedict's Dev. Co. v. St. Benedict's 
Hosp., 811 P.2d 194, 196 (Utah 1991)). "[I]f there is any doubt about whether a claim 
should be dismissed for lack of factual basis, the issue should be resolved in favor of 
giving the party an opportunity to present its proof." Colman v. Utah State Land Bd., 795 
P.2d 622, 624 (Utah 1990) (citing Baur v. Pac. Fin. Corp., 383 P.2d 397, 397 (1963)). 
Under this standard, the facts pled by the Russell Plaintiffs in their First Amended 
Jury Complaint and Demand ("complaint") must be accepted as true for purposes of this 
appeal. The arguments the Carson Defendants make ignores the governing standard. It 
requires the Court to weigh the facts alleged in the complaint against extrinsic evidence 
and arguments based thereon, ignoring all inferences, instead of accepting the allegations 
as true and construing all reasonable inferences in favor of the Russell Plaintiffs. 
Thomas argues it was appropriate for the district court to consider extrinsic 
documents in deciding the motion to dismiss because "[t]he only documents considered [] 
were those specifically referenced in the Amended Complaint, and the court may consider 
1 
documents attached as exhibits or incorporated by reference in the pleadings when 
deciding a motion to dismiss." (Thomas' Brief, pg. 3 n.l.) Thomas cites 2 JAMES W M . 
MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 3d § 12.34[2] (3rd Ed. 2002) for the 
proposition that "4[i]n deciding whether to dismiss, the court may consider . . . documents 
incorporated by reference in the pleadings . . . . ' " (Id., alterations in Thomas' Brief.) 
While the Russell Plaintiffs may have referred to extrinsic documents in the complaint, 
nowhere did they attach the documents or incorporate them by reference. Moreover, 
while the Russell Plaintiffs did not object to consideration of the documents below, they 
stringently objected to weighing facts established in the documents against the allegations 
in the complaint. (R. at 207, pgs. 10, 23, 37, 40.) Were the district court or this Court to 
do so, the standard governing motions to dismiss would be abrogated. 
RESPONSE TO CARSON DEFENDANTS' STATEMENTS OF FACT 
The Carson Defendants loosely paraphrase the allegations made in the complaint 
instead of directly stating those allegations. As explained above, the facts pled must be 
accepted as true for purposes of this appeal. Therefore, the Court should rely on the facts 
set forth in the Statement of Facts of the Russell Plaintiffs' opening brief, which are taken 
directly from the complaint. With that said, the Russell Plaintiffs respond to the 
numbered paragraphs of the briefs submitted by the Carson Defendants. 
Paragraph 1 of Both Briefs. 
Russell and Thomas were not technically partners of PRP, which was a limited 
liability corporation. Premier Homes, L.C. and Russell's corporation, Russell/Packard 
2 
Development, Inc., were members of PRP. Russell/Packard Development, Inc. later 
transferred its interest in PRP to Russell personally. Thomas was only affiliated with PRP 
as a member of Premier Homes, L.C. (R. at 75 fft 18-19, 76 f 26.). Thomas was never an 
agent of Russell personally. He was the manager of PRP and, as such, was an agent of 
PRP and fiduciary of the Russell Plaintiffs. (R. at 75 f 19, 761 26.) 
Paragraph 2 of Carson's and Bustos' Brief, paragraphs 2 & 3 of Thomas' Brief 
The Carson Defendants state Carson simply showed Thomas the Saratoga Lots in 
the summer of 1996 and that PRP did not make an offer to purchase them until after CMT 
had contracted to purchase them for $25,000 per lot. (Brief of Carson and Bustos, pgs. 2-
3, % 2, Brief of Thomas, pg. 4, ffl 2-3.) This representation omits numerous key facts the 
Russell Plaintiffs pled and is an oversimplication of what the Russell Plaintiffs alleged 
occurred, making it appear the Carson Defendants did not conspire and act to defraud the 
Russell Plaintiffs, which the Russell Plaintiffs pled in their complaint. They alleged the 
Carson Defendants did so by causing a "flip purchase and sale" of the Saratoga Lots 
creating the fictitious entity CMT to purchase them for $25,000 and immediately reselling 
them to PRP for $30,000 each, for a profit of $360,000. (R. at 77-80 ffl 28-51.) The 
Russell Plaintiffs pled in detail the precise steps the Carson Defendants took in doing so, 
which were recited in the Russell Plaintiffs' opening brief. (Russell Plaintiffs' Brief, pgs. 
6-9.) 
3 
Paragraph 3 of Carson's and Bustos' Brief 
While it is irrelevant, the Russell Plaintiffs did not agree to pay PRP $38,000 for 
each Saratoga Lot, as Carson and Bustos assert in their brief. (Brief of Carson and Bustos 
at pg. 3, f 3.) PRP "assign[ed] to Russell [personally] all of its right, title and interest in 
the [PRP] Contract and its right to acquire the Saratoga Property at the time of 
closing " The price of each Saratoga Lot was $30,000. (R. at 79, ffl 44-45.) The 
Russell Plaintiffs only agreed to pay PRP $8,000 per lot each time it sold one of the last 
66 Saratoga Lots to a residential homeowner. 
Moreover, PRP did not retain all of the assets of the company other than the 
Saratoga Lots. By assigning "all of its right, title and interest in the [PRP] Contract" to 
Russell, PRP also transferred any claims associated with the Saratoga Lots, which are the 
claims the Russell Plaintiffs asserted in their complaint. 
Paragraphs 4 & 5 of Carson's and Bustos' Brief paragraph 7 of Thomas' Brief 
The Carson Defendants assert the Russell Plaintiffs failed to allege the Carson 
Defendants made any misrepresentation directly to the Russell Plaintiffs. The Russell 
Plaintiffs may not have used the words, "Defendants represented to the Russell Plaintiffs 
that CMT was part of, affiliated with, or owned by Saratoga," as Carson and Bustos infer 
was required. However, the specific allegations of the complaint viewed as a whole with 
all reasonable inferences construed in favor of the Russell Plaintiffs, as they must be on a 
motion to dismiss, demonstrate the Russell Plaintiffs did assert Defendants represented to 
the Russell Plaintiffs that CMT was part of, affiliated with, or owned by Saratoga. 
4 
Moreover, while there is no allegation that Bustos acted as an agent for the Russell 
Plaintiffs or owed any duty to them, the Russell Plaintiffs did allege Bustos conspired 
with Carson and Thomas, fiduciaries of the Russell Plaintiffs, and acted in furtherance of 
the conspiracy to complete the transaction and hide the fraud from the Russell Plaintiffs. 
Paragraph 7 of Carson's and Bustos' Brief 
The facts asserted by Carson and Bustos in this paragraph are irrelevant. The facts 
Saratoga needed to learn to assert a claim were different than the facts the Russell 
Plaintiffs needed to learn to understand whether they had facts sufficient to state a claim 
against the Carson Defendants. 
Paragraph 8 of Carson's and Bustos' Brief 
This Court's conclusion in Russell v. Thomas, 2000 Utah Ct. App. 83, 999 P.2d 
1244 that the agreement in which the Russell Plaintiffs acquired "all of [PRP's] right, title 
and interest in the [PRP] Contract" was not a conveyance of an interest in property is 
irrelevant to the issues in this case and Carson and Bustos have not shown otherwise. 
Paragraph 8 of Thomas' Brief 
The Russell Plaintiffs did not admit they discovered in the Spring of 2000 the 
fraud committed by the Carson Defendants, as asserted by Thomas in his brief. The 
Russell Plaintiffs admitted they learned for the first time in the Spring of 2000 that CMT 
was not associated with Saratoga. This discovery merely alerted the Russell Plaintiffs 
that something might be wrong and gave rise to a duty by them to further investigate the 
true nature of the transactions. It was not until they conducted further inquiry and 
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investigation, and past all relevant statutes of limitation, that the Russell Plaintiffs learned 
the true nature of the fraudulent scheme. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE RUSSELL 
PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS FOR FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH 
APPLICABLE STATUTES OF LIMITATION. 
There is no dispute the four-year limitations period set forth in Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-12-25(3) governs the Russell Plaintiffs' claims for breach of fiduciary duty, civil 
conspiracy to defraud and to breach duties, unjust enrichment, breach of principal-agency 
relationship and intentional interference with prospective economic relations (collectively 
referred to as the "four-year claims") or that Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-26(4) governs the 
Russell Plaintiffs' claim for commercial bribery. There is no dispute the three-year 
limitations period set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-26 governs the Russell Plaintiffs' 
claim for fraud or that it contains an internal discovery requirement tolling the limitations 
period "until the discovery by the aggrieved party of the facts constituting the fraud . . . ." 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-26(3). There is also no dispute that "in situations where the 
discovery rule is mandated by statute . . . and in situations where a plaintiff does not 
become aware of the cause of action because of the defendant's concealment or 
misleading conduct," Spears v. Warr, 2002 UT 24 at f 33, 44 P.3d 742 (quoting Warren 
v. Provo City Corp., 838 P.2d 1125, 1129 (Utah 1992)), the "'limitations period does not 
begin to run until the discovery of facts forming the basis for the cause of action.'" 
Berenda v. Langford, 914 P.2d 45, 51 (Utah 1996) (quoting O'Neal v. Div. of Family 
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Servs., 821 P.2d 1139, 1143 (Utah 1991)) (internal quotation marks and additional 
citation omitted). 
The only disagreement is over when, under the discovery rule, the above statutes 
of limitations began to run. The Russell Plaintiffs acknowledged in their opening brief 
and below that they were put on notice in the Spring of 2000 that CMT was not 
associated with Saratoga. The Russell Plaintiffs explained why the limitations periods on 
all claims did not begin to run until that time. The Carson Defendants argue, however, 
the limitations periods began to run in November of 1996, which is when PRP executed 
its contract with CMT ("PRP Contract"). 
A. Lack of Internal Discovery Rule on Four-Year Claims. 
Carson and Bustos argue the lack of an internal discovery rule on the statute of 
limitations governing the four-year and commercial bribery claims automatically 
"obligated [the Russell Plaintiffs] to bring their claims within those four years," and cites 
Atwood v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 823 P.2d 1064, 1065 (Utah 1992), as support for this 
proposition. (Brief of Carson and Bustos, pg. 8.) This argument fails for several reasons. 
First, Atwood did not involve allegations of active concealment by the defendants, as 
were pled by the Russell Plaintiffs. Where fraudulent concealment is pled, there must be 
a determination as to several factors: 
(i) when a plaintiff would reasonably be on notice to inquire into a 
defendant's bad acts despite defendant's attempts to hide those acts; and (ii) 
whether a plaintiff, once on notice, reasonably would have discovered, with 
due diligence, the facts on which the cause of action is based despite the 
defendant's efforts to hide those facts. 
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Hill v. Allred, 2001 UT 16, f l8, 28 P.3d 1271 (citing Berenda v. Langford, 914 P.2d 45, 
52 (Utah 1996)). While the applicability of a statute of limitations and discovery rule are 
questions of law, "the applicability of the statute of limitations and the discovery rule also 
involves a subsidiary factual determination--thc point at which a person reasonably 
should know that he or she has suffered a legal injury. This is a question of fact." Id. at 
f 32 (citing Sevy v. Sec. Title Co. ofS. Utah, 902 P.2d 629, 634 (Utah 1995); Andreini v. 
Hultgren, 860 P.2d 916, 919 (Utah 1993)) (emphases added). Second, Atwood was 
decided on a motion for summary judgment, not a motion to dismiss, which is involved 
here and involves different standards. Third, Atwood actually supports the position of the 
Russell Plaintiffs, as explained in subsection 1(B) below. 
B. Concealment By the Carson Defendants. 
The Carson Defendants collectively argue the Russell Plaintiffs' allegations of 
concealment are insufficient to invoke the discovery rule to toll the applicable statutes of 
limitation. They assert the discovery rule does not apply because despite the allegations 
of concealment by the Carson Defendants, the Russell Plaintiffs admit being on notice in 
the Spring of 2000 - before expiration of the applicable statutes on all but the commercial 
bribery claims - of some of the facts giving rise to their claims. (Brief of Carson and 
1
 The Russell Plaintiffs explained in their opening brief that the three-year statute 
of limitations ran on their commercial bribery claim on November 7, 1999. Therefore, it 
had already expired even under the Carson Defendants' theory that the Russell Plaintiffs 
did not learn about any facts until the Spring of 2000. They did not argue to the contrary 
in their briefs. 
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Bustos, pgs. 8-10; Brief of Thomas, pgs. 7-9.) They cite Atwood as support for their 
position. 
The plaintiff in Atwood was injured when a gun manufactured by the defendant 
fell from its holster and discharged, injuring him. Id. at 1064. While the plaintiffs 
physical injury was immediately apparent, he alleged he had no knowledge of any legal 
injury until the spring of 1988 when he consulted his attorney on another matter and the 
attorney informed the plaintiff he might have a legal claim against the defendant because 
it had recalled pistols of the type owned by the plaintiff due to manufacturing defects. Id. 
The plaintiff did not file his complaint until four years and two days after the injury 
occurred. Id. 
The defendant filed a motion for summary judgment arguing the plaintiffs claims 
were barred because he did not file them within four years from the date of his injury, as 
required by Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25(3). Id. The trial court granted the motion and 
the plaintiff appealed. The Utah Supreme Court affirmed summary judgment. It 
reasoned the plaintiff had conceded he learned of his potential legal cause of action in the 
spring of 1988, which was several months before the expiration of the statute of 
limitations, and he offered no reason why he could not have filed within the limitations 
period. Id. at 1065. 
As explained in their opening brief, while the Russell Plaintiffs learned for the first 
time in the Spring of 2000 that CMT was not associated with Saratoga, which was 
approximately five months prior to the expiration of the four-year limitations periods, and 
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after the expiration of the three-year periods, they did not discover actual facts forming 
the basis for their causes of action until after the November 7, 2001 deadline. The 
inability to find a link in the Spring of 2000 between Saratoga and CMT was not proof 
the Carson Defendants had wronged the Russell Plaintiffs. It merely alerted the Russell 
Plaintiffs that something might be wrong and gave rise to a duty by them to further 
investigate the true nature of the transactions. It was not until they conducted further 
inquiry and investigation, and past all relevant statutes of limitation, that the Russell 
Plaintiffs learned the true nature of the scheme. It is at that time the statutes began to run, 
unlike in Atwood. 
In his brief, Thomas accuses the Russell Plaintiffs of "repeatedly play[ing] games 
with the statute of limitations analysis." (Brief of Thomas, pg. 8.) He asserts the Russell 
Plaintiffs initially conceded they learned "of the alleged problems with the transaction in 
the Spring of 2000" but after realizing "they had to come up with a better story . . . argue, 
for the first time on appeal, that while they knew in the Spring of 2000 that there had been 
a fraud, 'they did not discovery actual facts forming the basis for their causes of action 
until after the November 7, 2001 deadline.'" (Brief of Thomas, pg. 8, citing Opening 
Brief of Russell Plaintiffs.) Carson and Bustos argue, "There are no allegations that any 
time beyond the spring of 2000 was needed to discover facts or the alleged causes of 
action, or that any alleged concealment continued beyond that date." (Brief of Carson 
and Bustos, pg. 11.) They therefore conclude, "Because this argument was not advanced 
at the trial court, and was not a part of the allegations in the Amended Complaint, as a 
10 
matter of law, it should not be considered at this stage of the proceedings. (Brief of 
Carson and Bustos, pg. 12.) The record does not support these assertions. 
The Russell Plaintiffs plead they first discovered CMT was not the agent for, 
under the control of, or otherwise acting for Saratoga in the Spring of 2000, when an 
accountant working for Saratoga questioned the ownership or control status of CMT and 
discovered the possibility of the flip sale and purchase while preparing for the closings on 
the final twelve Saratoga Lots. (R. at 81 SI 55.) This placed the Russell Plaintiff on notice 
that CMT was not the agent for, under the control of, or otherwise acting for Saratoga and 
of no other fact. (R. at 81 f 58.) This led the Russell Plaintiffs to further investigate the 
true nature of the transactions. (R. at 81 f 55.) The Russell Plaintiffs pled the 
investigation concerning the ownership and control of CMT and the circumstances of the 
CMT Contract and PRP Contract took over one year and revealed the true nature of the 
flip sale and purchase. (R. at 81-82 ff 55, 58- 60.) Because these assertions were pled 
below, they were not raised for the first time on appeal and, along with all reasonable 
inferences gleaned therefrom, are appropriate to consider. 
Thomas argues in a footnote, "[T]his Court should not adopt a policy which allows 
plaintiffs to plead that the statute of limitations ran before discovery of the underlying 
facts, thus implicating the discovery rule, and then take as much time as they need - in 
this case \Vi years - to file their claims. This would make the limitations period 
indeterminate." (Brief of Thomas, pg. 9 n.3.) As explained above, that is not the 
situation here because the Russell Plaintiffs were only aware in the Spring of 2000 that 
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something might be wrong and gave rise to a duty by them to further investigate the true 
nature of the transactions. It was not until they conducted further inquiry and 
investigation, and past all relevant statutes of limitation, that the Russell Plaintiffs learned 
the true nature of the scheme and the statutes began to run. 
It is important to note that other than a passing mention of the case in the Brief of 
Carson and Bustos, none of the Carson Defendants attempt to analyze or distinguish the 
very persuasive and recent case of Hill v. Alfred, 2001 UT 16, 28 P.3d 1271. (Brief of 
Carson and Bustos, pgs. 11,14 and 23.) In Hill, the Utah Supreme Court ruled the 
defendants' active concealment of facts giving rise to plaintiffs' claims tolled the statute 
of limitations until the plaintiff first learned of the facts giving rise to her claims and 
discovered the identities of the defendants. Id. at % 19. It explained that operation of the 
discovery rule "prevents the limitations period from beginning to run until the facts 
forming the foundation for the cause of action are discovered." Id. at f 15 (citing 
Williams v. Howard, 970 P.2d 1282, 1285 (Utah 1998)). 
Like the plaintiff in Hill, the Russell Plaintiffs may have been put on notice they 
may have been wronged prior to expiration of the statute of limitations, but did not learn 
"facts forming the foundation for the cause of action" until after expiration of the 
limitations period due to the necessity of conducting an investigation into what happened. 
Id. at f 15. Contrary to the assertion of Carson and Bustos, the Russell Plaintiffs did not 
plead the Carson Defendants ceased concealment in the Spring of 2000. (Brief of Carson 
and Bustos, pg. 14.) Saratoga and the Russell Plaintiffs simply learned CMT was not 
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associated with either Saratoga or the Russell Plaintiffs, as previously believed. As in 
Hill, the district court should have applied the discovery rule based on concealment by the 
Carson Defendants, thereby tolling the limitations periods until the Spring of 2000, 
making the Russell Plaintiffs' claims timely. Its failure to do so constitutes reversible 
error. 
Further clouding the issues is the citation by Carson and Bustos to evidence that is 
not part of the record on appeal. They refer to an agreement between the Russell 
Plaintiffs and Saratoga relating to the closing of the final 12 Saratoga Lots as well as 
pending litigation between Saratoga and Carson and Bustos. These were never referred 
to in the complaint nor were they introduced as evidence. Therefore, they cannot be 
considered for purposes of this appeal. Moreover, these items are not relevant. The issue 
on appeal was whether the Russell Plaintiffs pled facts sufficient to state a claim and is 
analyzed under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Carson and Bustos produce these 
documents as support for their argument the Russell Plaintiffs knew of their claims prior 
to expiration of the limitations period. The Russell Plaintiffs pled they first learned CMT 
was not associated with PRP until the Spring of 2000 and that further investigation 
revealed after expiration of the limitations period the true nature of the flip-purchase and 
sale. On a motion to dismiss, courts are required to accept these allegations as true. 
Considering any extrinsic evidence and weighing facts, which is the only purpose of the 
agreement and complaint, is inappropriate under this standard. Therefore, while they 
13 
could become relevant on summary judgment motion, they are irrelevant for purposes of 
this appeal and should not be considered for any purpose. 
C. Notice Allegedly Imparted by Contract and Deeds. 
The Carson Defendants argue no concealment actually occurred because 
Russell/Packard had reasonable notice at the time of the first closing, which occurred 
sometime in 1997, that PRP was not purchasing the Saratoga Lots directly from Saratoga. 
(Brief of Carson and Bustos, pgs 13-14; Brief of Thomas, pgs. 10-11.) The Russell 
Plaintiffs explained in their opening brief whey these documents did not impart 
reasonable notice to them of CMT's actual part in the scheme. It is common for 
developers and builders to create special entities to with different names to "own" a 
project. Therefore, the fact CMT was named as the seller in the closing documents does 
not give notice to a reasonable person or even a reasonable developer or builder that CMT 
was not affiliated with Saratoga. The fact that Saratoga also did not learn CMT was not 
associated with PRP until the Spring of 2000 further supports the Russell Plaintiffs' 
argument that the closing documents by themselves, as alleged by the Carson Defendants, 
did not impart reasonable notice of CMT's position. 
Thomas argues in his brief: 
In determining whether the statute of limitations should be tolled due to 
fraudulent concealment, this court must determine: (i) when a plaintiff 
would reasonably be on notice to inquire into a defendant's bad acts despite 
defendant's attempts to hide those acts; and (ii) whether a plaintiff, once on 
notice, reasonably would have discovered, with due diligence, the facts on 
which the cause of action is based despite defendant's efforts to hide those 
facts. 
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(Brief of Thomas, pg. 11, quoting Hill v. Alfred, 2001 UT 18, 28 P.3d 1271, citing 
Berenda, 914 P.2d at 52.) He then goes on to argue the Russell Plaintiffs' acts were not 
reasonable in light of the efforts of the Carson Defendants to conceal those facts. His 
argument ignores the Hill court's language in the very next sentence, which reads: 
[W]hen a defendant has concealed a plaintiffs cause of action, the 
questions of when a plaintiff should reasonably begin inquiring about the 
defendant's wrongdoing and whether, once on notice, the plaintiff has acted 
with reasonable diligence to discover the facts forming the basis of the 
cause of action are all highly fact-dependent legal questions. . . . We 
explicitly acknowledge that weighing the reasonableness of the plaintiff's 
conduct in light of the defendant's steps to conceal the cause of action 
necessitates the type of factual findings which preclude summary judgment 
in all but the clearest of cases. 
Id. (citing Berenda, 914 P.2d at 53-54; Chapman v. Primary Children's Hosp., 784 P.2d 
1181, 1186 (Utah 1989) (stating that in medical malpractice action "close calls" of 
whether plaintiffs acted reasonably in failing to discover the cause of action "are for 
juries, not judges, to make")) (emphases added). 
The argument urged by the Carson Defendants relating to notice imparted by the 
PRP Contract and deeds executed on each closing require the Court to engage in the type 
of factfinding precluded by Hill. It would require the Court to weigh whether the Russell 
Plaintiffs' conduct was reasonable against the Carson Defendants' efforts to conceal their 
wrongful conduct. Under the standard enumerated by the Utah Supreme Court, it would 
be inappropriate to do so, particularly on a motion to dismiss, where the allegations of 
the complaint must be accepted as true. 
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II. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE RUSSELL 
PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS FOR LACK OF STANDING. 
The Carson Defendants all argue the April 1997 assignment of the Saratoga Lots 
from PRP to the Russell Plaintiffs did not include any claim PRP may have had for fraud 
relating to the Saratoga Lots. (Brief of Carson and Bustos, pgs. 19-20; Brief of Thomas, 
pg. 13.) The phrase in the assignment "all of [PRP's] right, title and interest in the [PRP] 
Contract" necessarily includes any claims relating to the purchase of the Saratoga Lots 
referenced in the PRP Contract. It is not limited, as argued, to the Saratoga Lots. It 
includes everything associated with the PRP Contract. The assignment could not be any 
more clear, unambiguous or inclusive. It is the purchase of those lots and the 
representations, acts and omissions associated with it which form the basis of the Russell 
Plaintiffs' claims against the Carson Defendants. Moreover, the Purchase and 
Development Agreement grants the same rights to Russell individually as to 
Russell/Packard. 
The Carson Defendants next argue the Russell Plaintiffs lack standing to assert a 
claim for fraud because PRP's assignment to them cannot by law include an assignment 
of a claim for fraud. (Brief of Thomas, pgs. 14; Brief of Carson and Bustos, pg. 18 n.2.) 
Counsel for the Russell Plaintiffs were unable to find any statute or case law in Utah 
addressing the issue. The Carson Defendants cite none in their briefs. The Carson 
Defendants cite to cases from other jurisdictions holding fraud claims are not assignable. 
(Id.) Assignments of tort claims are often valid. 6 AM. JUR.2D ASSIGNMENTS § 60 
(1999). Several courts have ruled, as represented by the Carson Defendants, that fraud 
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claims are generally personal in nature and not assignable. However, there have been 
exceptions. The California Court of Appeals held in Mclaughlin v. National Union Fire 
Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, PA., 29 Cal.Rptr.2d 559, 567 (Cal. App. 4th 1994), 
"[T]he exception [prohibiting the assignment of fraud claims] is confined to purely 
personal torts-those involving wrongs done to the person, reputation or feelings of the 
injured party " Id. at 567 (citing Murphy v. Allstate Ins. Co. (1976) 17 Cal.3d 937, 
942, 132 Cal.Rptr. 424, 553 P.2d 584; Bush v. Superior Court (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 
1374, 1381, 13 Cal.Rptr.2d 382.) It further explained, "[A] 'naked' cause of action for 
fraud, 'unconnected with any property or thing which had itself a legal existence and 
value independent of the right to sue for fraud' is not assignable." Id. (quoting Jackson 
v. Deauville Holding Co. (1933) 219 Cal. 498, 502, 27 P.2d 643.) It held the general rule 
did not apply where a company "and its directors and officers, owed them [the plaintiffs] 
certain duties . . ." and the where the "purportedly fraudulent behavior . . . led to breaches 
of these duties with serious economic consequences." Id. It finished, "Such claims do 
not entail purely personal wrongs and, thus, they are assignable . . . ." Id. 
Such is the case here. Thomas, Carson and Bustos are all fiduciaries of PRP: 
Thomas as a managing partner of the company, Carson as both the direct real estate agent 
of PRP and as an employee of the Wardley company, which also was the agent for PRP, 
and Bustos as an employee of Wardley. They breached those duties to PRP. The fraud 
they committed did not involve "wrongs done to the person, reputation or feelings" of in 
injured person. It involved "serious economic consequences" to PRP. Accordingly, their 
fraudulent behavior was within the exception and was assignable. 
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Even if it were not, the Russell Plaintiffs' claims for fraud arising out of PRP's 
purchase of the Saratoga Lots did not belong solely to PRP, in contravention to the 
arguments made by the Carson Defendants. (Brief of Carson and Bustos, pg. 18; Brief of 
Thomas, pgs. 14-15, 18.) The Russell Plaintiffs pled they were personally damaged 
because PRP purchased them for $30,000 as result of the Carson Defendants' wrongful 
conduct when they were available for $25,000. The profit of the Russell Plaintiffs was 
therefore cut as a result and they were personally damaged by the fraud. 
The Carson Defendants further argue that because Thomas was part of PRP and 
had knowledge of the fraud and that CMT was not associated with Saratoga, Carson and 
Bustos could not have acted to defraud PRP. (Brief of Carson and Bustos, pg. 18; Brief 
of Thomas, pgs. 14-15, 18.) This assertion is absurd. A major premise of the fraud claim 
is that Carson and Bustos engaged in a conspiracy with Thomas to defraud PRP and the 
Russell Plaintiffs out of $360,000. They accomplished their scheme through the flip-sale 
and purchase by having PRP pay $5,000 more per lot for their own personal gain. By 
working with Thomas in furtherance of this scheme, they defrauded PRP and the Russell 
Plaintiffs. 
The citation by Carson and Bustos to Horrocks v. Westfalia Systemat, 892 P.2d 14 
(Utah Ct. App. 1995), is inapplicable. The court in Horrocks ruled knowledge of an 
agent may be imputed to the principal, even where the agent acts adversely to the 
principal. Id. at 17. Quoting the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY, the court limited 
the situation to where "the failure of the agent to act upon or to reveal the information 
results in a violation of a contractual or relational duty of the principal to a person harmed 
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thereby . . . [or] if the agent enters into negotiations within the scope of his powers and 
the person with whom he deals reasonably believes him to be authorized to conduct the 
transaction " Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 282 (1958)) 
(alteration in original). Neither situation applies here. As pled, PRP had to duty, 
contractual or otherwise, to Carson and Bustos. Moreover, Carson and Bustos were not 
harmed but benefitted and participated in the fraud. Finally, Carson and Bustos knew 
Thomas was using his position with PRP to defraud PRP and the Russell Plaintiffs and, 
therefore, knew he was not authorized to defraud PRP out of $360,000. 
Carson and Bustos further argue any claim successfully assigned to the Russell 
Plaintiffs by PRP "died when PRP expired" on April 23, 2001. (Brief of Carson and 
Bustos, pg. 19.) This argument is also unfounded. PRP assigned "Russell all of its right, 
title and interest in the [PRP] Contract," and therefore any fraud claim, on April 2, 1997. 
The claim did not expire where the company assigned it before expiration. Carson and 
Bustos provide no support to the contrary. It would be against public policy to hold 
otherwise. Parties taking an assignment for value, as the Russell Plaintiffs, would have 
no assurance that their assignment would not expire at the whim of the assignee. 
The Carson Defendants finally argue the Russell Plaintiffs are complaining solely 
about conduct relating to the contract between Saratoga and CMT. (Brief of Thomas, pg. 
19; Brief of Carson and Bustos, pg. 18 n.3.) That is simply not the case. It is undisputed 
that the Russell Plaintiffs alleged "Defendants," which includes both Carson and Bustos, 
knowingly and falsely represented to Saratoga that CMT was part of, affiliated with or 
owned by the Russell Plaintiffs for the purpose of inducing Saratoga to sell the Saratoga 
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Lots to CMT for $25,000 and that Saratoga relied on the representations in selling the 
Saratoga Lots to CMT. It is also undisputed that the Russell Plaintiffs pled the Carson 
Defendants furthered their scheme both as to Saratoga and the Russell Plaintiffs by 
consistently misrepresenting Saratoga to the Russell Plaintiffs as the builder or buyer 
(implying the buyer from Saratoga) and introducing Saratoga and its representatives to the 
Russell Plaintiffs as the seller (implying the seller to the Russell Plaintiffs) or developer. 
Moreover, Thomas issued a check from PRP to Superior Title for $5,000 dated only 
"November 1996" which references earnest money. Instead, the $10,000 earnest money 
wire under the CMT Contract referencing Poe was distributed at closing by checks to 
Carson and to Bustos at their direction. (R. at 79-80f 48.) Additionally, The CMT 
Contract and the PRP Contract had identical closing terms except for the price. (R. 80 
f 49.) Those representations not only lead Saratoga and the Russell Plaintiffs to believe 
PRP was purchasing the lots directly from Saratoga but resulted in the concealment until 
the Spring of 2000 of the fact CMT was not affiliated with either PRP or Saratoga. (R. at 
81 f|[ 56 & 59.) The Russell Plaintiffs were led by the Carson Defendants to believe that 
CMT was affiliated with, a part of, or owned by Saratoga and that PRP was purchasing 
the Saratoga Lots directly from Saratoga, which is the manner in which the negotiations 
had been conducted. (R. at 78 f 37.) 
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III. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE RUSSELL 
PLAINTIFFS9 CLAIMS FOR FAILURE ADEQUATELY PLEAD 
FRAUD. 
The Carson Defendants argue the Russell Plaintiffs failed to allege any of the 
Carson Defendants made any misrepresentation directly to the Russell Plaintiffs. It is 
undisputed that the standard enumerated by the Utah Supreme Court in Pace v. Parish, 
247 P.2d 273 (Utah 1952) sets forth the test for pleading fraud. Pace states that to prove 
a claim for fraudulent misrepresentation, a plaintiff must prove the following elements: 
(1) That a representation was made; (2) concerning a presently existing 
material fact; (3) which was false; (4) which the representor either (a) knew 
to be false, or (b) made recklessly, knowing that he had insufficient 
knowledge upon which to base such representation; (5) for the purpose of 
inducing the other party to act upon it; (6) that the other party, acting 
reasonably and in ignorance of its falsity; (7) did in fact rely upon it; (8) and 
was thereby induced to act; (9) to his injury and damage. 
Id. at 274-75 (citing Stuck v. Delta Land & Water Co., 227 P. 791 (Utah 1924); Jones v. 
Pingree, 273 P. 303 (Utah 1928); 23 AM. JUR. 773; 37 C.J.S., Fraud, § 3, p. 215). There 
is nothing in the test that requires the fraudulent misrepresentation be made directly to a 
plaintiff. As explained by the Russell Plaintiffs in their opening brief, it is sufficient that 
the misrepresentation is made for the purpose of inducing a plaintiff to act and the 
plaintiff relies on it to its detriment. Pace v. Parish, 247 P.2d 273 (Utah 1952). 
The Russell Plaintiffs have alleged facts supporting each of the above elements. 
The Russell Plaintiffs pled the following facts on the elements of conduct affirming a 
presently existing fact, falsity and knowledge of falsity: 
1. The Carson Defendants conspired for PRP to purchase the lots from Saratoga in 
a manner which would be damaging to plaintiffs; 
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2. They accomplished their scheme by Thomas "retaining" Carson to act as the agent 
for PRP to negotiate with Saratoga and its agent for PRP to purchase the lots 
directly from Saratoga; 
3. Carson told Saratoga's agent on several occasions that CMT, which did not even 
exist at the time, was affiliated with, a part of, or owned by the Russell Plaintiffs, 
which it was not; and 
4. The Carson Defendants formulated a scheme in which they introduced the Russell 
Plaintiffs to Saratoga and continually referred them as the builder or buyer. They 
also introduced Saratoga's representatives to the Russell Plaintiffs and continually 
referred to them as the seller or developer. The inference from this allegation is 
that the representations led both parties to believe PRP would be purchasing the 
Saratoga Lots directly from Saratoga. 
(R. at 77, 81 f|[ 28-30, 35-36, 38, 56.) 
The Russell Plaintiffs pled the following facts on the element of purposeful 
inducement: 
1. The Carson Defendants used and converted PRP's proprietary plans and drawings 
for the development and construction of the Saratoga Lots; 
2. The Carson Defendants failed to inform the Russell Plaintiffs of all material facts 
relating to the lots, such as their initial asking price and the fact they were sold to 
CMT as a flip purchase and sale; and 
3. The Carson Defendants misrepresented to the Russell Plaintiffs the manner in 
which the negotiations for purchase of the Saratoga Lots by PRP were conducted; 
and 
(R. at 78-79 at ffl 40-44.) 
The Russell Plaintiffs pled the following fact on the elements of actual inducement 
and reliance: 
1. The Russell Plaintiffs signed a contract to purchase the Saratoga Lots for $30,000 
each. 
(R. at 79 ffl44-45, 47.) 
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The Russell Plaintiffs pled the following facts on the element of reasonableness of 
their reliance: 
1. Defendant Thomas was at all material the manager PRP and an agent and a 
fiduciary of PRP and the Russell Plaintiffs; 
2. Defendant Carson was a real estate agent for the PRP while employed by the 
brokerage of Wardley. The inference therefrom is that he owed fiduciary duties to 
PRP; 
3. Defendant Bustos was a real estate agent of Wardley. The inference therefrom is 
that as an agent with Wardley, who was the agent for PRP, he owed PRP and the 
Russell Plaintiffs fiduciary duties; 
4. The Carson Defendants formulated a scheme in which they introduced the Russell 
Plaintiffs to Saratoga and continually referred them as the builder or buyer. They 
also introduced Saratoga's representatives to the Russell Plaintiffs and continually 
referred to them as the seller or developer. The inference from this allegation is 
that the representations led both parties to believe PRP would be purchasing the 
Saratoga Lots directly from Saratoga. 
(R. at 73, 78, 81, 83 <B 3-5, 37, 56, 71.) 
The Russell Plaintiffs pled the following facts on the element of injury and 
damages: 
1. The Russell Plaintiffs reasonably relied upon the acts and conduct of defendants, 
to their detriment and damage. They were damaged as a result, purchasing the 
Saratoga Lots for $5,000 more per lot than they should or would have paid had 
they been fully and truthfully informed. 
(R. at 80, 83-89 <H 50, 71, 73, 82, 90, 95, 97, 103, 111.) 
As demonstrated above, the Russell Plaintiffs pled every element necessary to 
meet their burden. Consequently, the arguments by the Carson Defendants that the 
Russell Plaintiffs did not meet that burden is erroneous. 
Defendant Thomas additionally argues that because the Russell Plaintiffs did not 
learn of the alleged misrepresentation until the Spring of 2000, they "could not possibly 
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have relied on any such misrepresentation in November of 1996." (Brief of Thomas, pg. 
17.) This argument is senseless. The Russell Plaintiffs did not have to know the 
misrepresentations were false at the time they relied on them. Had they known they were 
false, they would not have relied on them. They simply had to rely on them, which they 
did, as demonstrated above. 
Defendant Thomas also argues the Russell Plaintiffs' fraud claim is barred because 
they cannot prove damages. (Brief of Thomas, pg. 19.) They claim there are no damages 
because PRP agreed to purchase the Saratoga Lots for $30,000 each, which is exactly 
what they paid for them. (Id.) This argument fails for two reasons. First, the standard 
applicable here is a motion to dismiss. It does not matter at this stage whether the Russell 
Plaintiffs can actually prove their claimed damages. The only issue is whether they pled 
damages. As shown above, they did. Second, the Russell Plaintiffs pled they were 
damaged because PRP purchased them for $30,000 as result of the Carson Defendants' 
wrongful conduct when they were available for $25,000. PRP's profit was, therefore, cut 
as the Russell Plaintiffs alleged. Consequently, they were damaged. 
Bustos additionally argues he never "communicated with plaintiffs while the 
transactions were occurring" and "there was no representation made by Bustos to 
plaintiffs." (Brief of Carson and Bustos, pg. 24.) From that he concludes the Russell 
Plaintiffs cannot assert a claim for fraud against him. As explained above and in the 
opening brief of the Russell Plaintiffs, there is nothing that requires a fraudulent 
misrepresentation be made directly by a defendant to a plaintiff. It is sufficient that 
representations made by a defendant are made and that they are do so for the purpose of 
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inducing a plaintiff to act and the plaintiff relies on it to its detriment. Pace v. Parish, 
247 P.2d 273 (Utah 1952). As outlined above, the Russell Plaintiffs so pled against 
"Defendants," which includes Bustos. 
Bustos then states the Russell Plaintiffs have conceded Bustos owed them no 
fiduciary duties. (Brief of Carson and Bustos, pg. 24.) He cites nowhere in the record for 
his assertion. His statement implies the argument he made below that because he owed 
the Russell Plaintiffs no duties, they cannot state a claim against him. His implied 
assertion is wrong. As explained in the Russell Plaintiffs' opening brief, the only claims 
asserted by the Russell Plaintiffs' that require the existence of such a relationship are for 
breach of fiduciary duty and breach of principal agency relationship. Neither of these two 
claims are made against Bustos. The remaining claims do not require the existence of an 
agency relationship and there was no proof to the contrary, either factual or caselaw. 
Therefore, the remaining claims against him should stand as pled. 
Even if a fiduciary duty were required, the inference from the Russell Plaintiffs' 
complaint can be made. Defendant Carson was a real estate agent for the PRP while employed 
by the Defendant Bustos was a real estate agent of Wardley. The inference therefrom is that as 
an agent with Wardley, who was the agent for PRP, he owed PRP and the Russell Plaintiffs 
fiduciary duties. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, the Russell Plaintiffs respectfully request that the 
Court reverse the trial court's dismissal of their Complaint and remand the case for 
further proceedings in accordance with the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
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